In recent years, the ties that Members of Parliament (MPs) create by cosponsoring legislation together have a racted interest from scholars adopting a network approach to lawmaking.
is brief note expands the empirical base of these studies by introducing a dataset of 150 bill cosponsorship networks that cover 27 parliamentary chambers from 19 European countries, plus Israel. e data show the extent of partisanship expressed by MPs through their propensity to cosponsor bills within and across party lines, in several di erent parliamentary systems.
In recent years, the ties that Members of Parliament (MPs) create by cosponsoring legislation together have a racted interest from scholars adopting a network approach to lawmaking. e general objective of that approach, which takes advantage of important developments in the statistical modeling of political and social networks (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011; Snijders, 2011) , consists in identifying the relational determinants that underlie legislative production, such as shared a ributes of legislators or 'friend-of-a-friend' e ects. From that perspective, the formation of cosponsorship ties is a possible entry point into the collaborative structure of parliamentary chambers (Kirkland, 2014) , and a useful complement to legislative productivity and roll-call voting records in the study of parliamentary behaviour.
To our knowledge, such network approaches to legislative cosponsorship have so far been conducted on a limited range of country cases. e literature that we reviewed includes numerous studies of both Congressional houses of the United States, pioneered by the work of Fowler (2006a; 2006b) , as well as studies of its state legislatures (Bra on & Rouse, 2011; Clark & Caro, 2013; Kirkland, 2013) . We also located studies of legislative cosponsorship networks in the parliaments of Argentina (Alemán & Calvo, 2013; Micozzi, 2014) , Chile (Alemán & Calvo, 2013 ) and a subset of the Romanian parliament (Chiru & Neamţu, 2012) . 1 However, no comprehensive dataset currently exists to allow for the comparative analysis of such networks over a more diverse set of legislative environments.
is brief note therefore aims at contributing to network studies of legislative cosponsorship by expanding their empirical base to several additional countries. rough the use of various web scraping technologies (Munzert et al., 2015) , we tried to collect information on private bills 2 and their sponsors from the o cial websites of 33 parliaments, or from 1 Our search also returned visual explorations of bill cosponsorship in the lower houses of the French (Coulmont, 2011) and Czech (Gregor, 2013) parliaments, and similar research on Korean legislators (Ji-yeon Lee & Yoon, 2014) . 2 We focused our a ention on private bills, de ned as laws initiated by one or more MPs that become binding if they make it through the legislative process of their country of introduction.
is de nition is compatible with theoretical assumptions on how MPs signal their positions to their constituents or to third parties, and is comparable across countries. Using the same parliamentary sources as for bills, we then retrieved as much information as possible on the individual legislators who nominally sponsored the bills. e variables collected across all countries include sponsor age, sex and parliamentary career information (time in o ce, constituency, commi ee membership and party a liation), for a total of over 18,000 MPs who appeared on at least one cosponsored bill. To further characterize the positions of bill sponsors relative to each other, we also proceeded to match their party In order to do so, we used the scores available in the latest edition of the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2014) , which are time-invariant scores computed as the weighted mean values of party positions taken from several expert surveys on political parties. 3 Figure 1 shows one of the cosponsorship networks that can be constructed from the data we collected, using force-directed placement (Fruchterman & Reingold, 1991) . e network, which shows bill cosponsorship ties in the ongoing legislature of the unicameral parliament of Sweden, is a one-mode projection of the b × a two-mode matrix, where b denotes bills and a denotes their sponsors, that connects the rst author of each bill to all other sponsors on that bill. e resulting adjacency matrix A ij of directed ties between MPs (i, j) is asymmetric and contains no self-loops.
In order to further explore the collaborations that take place in legislative cosponsorship networks, we also built interactive versions of the same graphs, which allow the user to explore the ego networks of speci c MPs. ese visualisations, an example of which is shown in Figure 2 , are available online at http://f.briatte.org/parlviz/. Last, because legislative cosponsorship networks are based on ties that represent one or more than shared bill(s) between two MPs, we computed several measures to weight their edges accordingly. ese measures (raw cosponsorship counts, the weighted quantity of bills cosponsored and the weighted propensity to cosponsor) are taken from existing studies of legislative cosponsorship in the U.S. Congress (Fowler, 2006a; Gross et al., 2012) , and are documented in full in the appendix to this note. Figure 1 and as visible in the interactive visualizations previously mentioned, all of the 146 observed networks clearly show the in uence of party a liations over decisions to cosponsor bills. Using these data, the extent of partisanship expressed by MPs through their propensity to cosponsor bills within and across party lines might be measured through di erent methods: several studies of the U.S. Congress (Zhang et al., 2008; Waugh et al., 2009; Moody & Mucha, 2013) use the modularity network statistic (Newman & Girvan, 2004; Leicht & Newman, 2008) to that e ect, but the data are also amenable to other estimation methods, such as exponential random graph models (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011; Snijders, 2011) . Such measures should con rm that, as Sartori (1976 Sartori ( /2005 observed several decades ago, the distribution of power between political parties can take many di erent forms in highly competitive electoral environments, as "the fragmentation of the party system can re ect either a situation of segmentation or a situation of polarisation, i.e., of ideological distance" (p. 111). e levels of party polarization shown in the networks under study represent only one of many possible ways to explore the individual and institutional determinants that govern over the decisions of MPs to cosponsor each other's bills. In similar fashion to Moody and Mucha (2013) , we therefore hope that the data presented in this note, might serve as an introduction to a complex empirical puzzle, extended to a set of country cases that allow for comparative inquiry, and supported by interactive network visualizations.
As illustrated in

